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23 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Mark Clark Committee Members' Visit to
 ORR, 23 November 1954

1. Colonel Miller and Mr. McGruder met with Mr. Morell and [REDACTED] at 0900 in D/E offices. [REDACTED]

2. Colonel Miller largely confined his questions to the "What do you do and how do you do it?" approach. During the presentation of the background and development of D/E functions, he inquired as to the sources of information necessary to effect controls on strategic items and precisely how this information was used. At one point he needed a detailed explanation to convince him that there was no unnecessary duplication between the D/E staff and the Diversion Control Net function.

3. Both Colonel Miller and Mr. McGruder asked their usual questions concerning authority or terms of reference for various activities and coordinating functions. They are also interested in exactly which components have intelligence production functions and which are pure coordinating.

4. The visit was concluded by a brief tour through the E/ST files.

5. From 10:15 to 11:30 a.m., Colonel Miller and Mr. McGruder were briefed by [REDACTED] and the D/T staff. Here again there were no budgetary or administrative questions asked. The following questions were asked and appear to be indicative of a substantive interest in operations:

a. What is the nature of Division's authority: Is it adequate or should a more formal directive be forthcoming?

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b. How many people are trained to do field collections? Is this number adequate?

c. What are the necessary qualifications for D/T analysts? (Special question was asked on language competence.)

d. To what extent do field operations receive Service support?

e. [REDACTED]

f. [REDACTED]

g. How are analysis priorities determined?

h. What overseas competence does the Division have and do these personnel do anything except collect?

i. What is the organization of the Division?

6. They were conducted on a very brief tour of the Office and both seemed impressed with techniques employed. Colonel Miller subsequently remarked on the enthusiasm of the analysts.

7. Attached is a statement by the Chief, Basic Division, on the visit of Colonel Miller and Mr. McGruder to that office. It should also be mentioned that Colonel Miller brought up the matter of Career Service rotation of personnel and how it might affect offices wherein a continuity of service was desirable.

[REDACTED]
Executive, OHR

Enclosure:
Statement of D/B/RR

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RESUME OF CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH THE
STAFF MEMBERS OF THE CLARK COMMITTEE
Tuesday, 23 November 1954

Present were: Colonel Miller, Mr. McGruder, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. The staff members arrived at approximately 11:30 A.M., having been delayed in examination of other ORR components. Upon arrival Colonel Miller indicated that he had to report to the Task Force of the Clark Committee and would be unable to be present for several hours. He returned at approximately 3 P.M. and remained for fifty minutes for a brief question period at the end of the discussion.

2. I inquired of Mr. McGruder whether or not he had read the report on the NIS Program which had been prepared for the Clark Committee and he informed me that he had not. I therefore took the next hour to brief him on the background and development of the NIS Program. We adjourned for lunch at 12:30 and at 1:30 continued discussions. The questions raised by the staff members, specifically Mr. McGruder, gave no definite pattern as to the objective of the Clark Committee or of the staff members themselves. They generally indicated lack of familiarity of much intelligence operations, as well as the mission, purpose and development of the NIS Program itself. In consequence, much of the discussion was that of clarification of these points. Many times our discussion digressed to minutia. Several times I attempted to bring it back to fundamental points and to give them as well rounded a view as could be made available.

3. After general discussions we went to the different branches in the Division, discussing the problems with the Branch Chiefs. The last fifty minutes were devoted to bringing Colonel Miller up to date on our discussions and replying to certain questions which he raised.

4. The general flavor of Colonel Miller's questions were, it appeared, in terms of getting other nations to do parts of this job. First the British, and then specifically he mentioned France and Italy as areas which might reasonably be expected to do NIS for us on those countries in return for the large funds made available to them from this country. After I had pointed out the communist infiltration in both Italy and France, and the highly questionable results of any such intelligence produced in those countries, he inquired about the South American countries doing the job for us in those areas. His questions indicated in my mind a lack of awareness of what the NIS was in its whole intent and a rather naive viewpoint as to the end product being the alpha and omega of the whole intelligence process as though in fact we could rely on any such intelligence product in a foreign country to satisfy our own requirements.

5. Summary. I was generally disappointed in the previous briefing of the staff members in terms of the NIS picture not only in their failure to read what had been produced for their enlightenment, which would have saved much time and avoided a large part of our discussions, but also in terms of the level of interest which they showed respecting aspects of intelligence as well as the NIS Program. Their questions appeared to be without pattern and without any full awareness of the important aspects of the intelligence process. I cannot gauge the amount of information which they received from my briefing or from those of my Branch Chiefs. As a general conclusion I would say they were as much confused as enlightened because of their lack of background before coming down here. I might add that there were no questions respecting budgetary support of other agencies in the program or any questions on personnel or budgetary aspects. Colonel Miller indicated on leaving that he might well return after he had found out what they wanted to know. In conclusion, I think they saw only the underbrush and neither the trees nor the woods.

